



# NAURU

MARITIME ADMINISTRATION

## SECURITY THREATS IN SOUTHERN RED SEA & GULF OF ADEN (NMA\_C50.2024.Rev.0)

### PURPOSE:

To provide information regarding the imminent threat of attacks on vessels transiting the Southern Red Sea (SRS) and Gulf of Aden (GOA) by armed skiffs, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), anti-ship missiles and waterborne improvised explosive devices (WBIED). More Information here:

<https://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/Pages/Red-Sea.aspx>

### REFERENCE:

- a) Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) Guidance for Shipping Navigating the Southern Red Sea – Issue 01/2023, 23 December 2023
- b) Interim Industry Transit Advice, Southern Red Sea, and Gulf of Aden – 15 December 2023
- c) Nauru Shipping Circular C47 – Ship Security Level
- d) Nauru Shipping Circular C48 – Best Management Practices for Piracy & Armed Robbery in High-Risk Areas
- e) Nauru Shipping Circular C49 – Firearms & Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel

### DEFINITIONS:

The term “Administration” shall mean the Nauru Maritime Administration.

### APPLICATION:

This marine circular applies to all Nauru-flagged vessels intending to call or transit areas in the SRS and GOA.

### CONTENTS:

1. Nauru-flagged vessels transiting through the RS and GOA shall raise their Security Level to Security Level 3 and implement all measures according to their Ship Security Plan. Vessels not subjected to ISPS Code shall adopt the security measures, as close as possible to Security Level 3 of the ISPS Code.
2. Masters of Nauru-flagged vessels operating within territorial seas or calling ports within the High-Risk Area (HRA) as defined by the industry Best Management Practices (BMP) shall operate at the Security Level set by the port State authority but may implement security measures in excess of that security level based on their assessment of the conditions in the port.
3. When operating outside territorial seas or ports within the HRA, Nauru-flagged vessels shall operate at least at Security Level 2.
4. All security level changes should be reported to this Administration at email: [ssas@naurumaritime.com](mailto:ssas@naurumaritime.com)

5. Prior to transiting the Western Indian Ocean, the Somali Basin, Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman and the Red Sea, vessels should register with the Maritime Security Centre - Horn of Africa (MSCHOA):

Email: [postmaster@mschoa.org](mailto:postmaster@mschoa.org)  
Phone: +44 1923 958545 / +44 1923 958700  
Website: [www.mschoa.org](http://www.mschoa.org)

and when transiting the above areas, report to the United Kingdom Marine Trade Operation (UKMTO):

Email: [watchkeepers@ukmto.org](mailto:watchkeepers@ukmto.org); [ukmto@eim.ae](mailto:ukmto@eim.ae)  
Phone: +44 2392 222060 / +971 50 552 3215  
Website: [www.ukmto.org](http://www.ukmto.org)

and follow the advice from the coalition forces operating in the area.

6. Guidance on reporting to UKMTO include:
  - 6.1. Initial report upon entering the UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Area (VRA).
  - 6.2. Daily updates on ship's position, course and speed. The frequency of these reports may be increased by vessels especially if AIS is switched-off.
  - 6.3. Final reports upon departure from VRA or arrival at destination port.
  - 6.4. Reports of suspicious / irregular activity, when necessary.
7. Ship Operators of Nauru-flagged vessels transiting the HRAs should also notify the vessel's P&I and consider any guidance and recommendations issued.
8. Consider the latest maritime security information from organizations supporting the VRA and carry out specific pre-voyage threat and risk assessments accordingly.
9. Keep the ship's Automatic Information System (AIS) be turned on as Houthi militia have attacked ships regardless of AIS being on or off, however, as per paragraph 22 of IMO Resolution A1106(29), a master may turn off the AIS if he/she believes that the continual operation of AIS might compromise the safety and security of the vessel where security incidents are imminent. It should be noted that while switching off the AIS may make it more difficult for the militia to track a vessel, it will also make it more difficult for the vessel to receive support if required. Rather than switching off the AIS, master should consider limiting AIS data to the mandatory fields and omitting the next port of call.
10. Consider the use of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP). Refer to Nauru Shipping Circular C49 for more information.
11. In the event of an attack while navigating in the Southern RS and contacted by "Yemeni Navy" to alter course to Al Hudaydah or another location on the North-West coast of Yemen:
  - 11.1. Ignore the VHF call and continue passage if safe to do so.
  - 11.2. Call for coalition warship on VHF Channel 16, inform them of vessel location, current situation, state your intentions and seek advice.
  - 11.3. Contact UKMTO, own Company Security Officer (CSO) and the U.S. Naval Forces Command maritime operations centre at +973 1785 3879